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As I remember from our conversations during those years, conversations we would recall some thirty years later when he spent some time with me in Philadelphia, we were looking for some way of doing Indian philosophy that would steer us clear of the paths that lay before us and with which many of us had already become disenchanted. Our professors in Calcutta-with perhaps the two exceptions of Rash Vihary Das and Kalidas Bhattacharyya-talked about Indian philosophy in edifying language. Not that they did not know the texts. They wanted to instill in us the perception that Indian philosophy was superior to Western philosophy in many ways, one of them being that Indian thought was practical (aiming at the removal of pain and suffering, leading eventually to moksa) and spiritual (in a rather undefined sense of that term, and we all felt we knew what it was about), culminating in a mystic intuition of the truth. All this was contrasted with the perception that Western philosophy was theoretical, intellectual, and removed from deep existential problems. (It struck me much later as strange that Husserl, in his Vienna lectures, drew a similar contrast, but used the alleged theoretical character of Western philosophy to show its superiority over the practicality-oriented Eastern thought. This only confirmed my suspicion that such contrasts must be spurious.) We did not want edifying discourse. Navya-Nyaya convinced us that Indian thinking was rigorously theoretical and relentlessly intellectual.
Both Matilal and I had developed a dissatisfaction also with the way the Western Indologist, trained admirably in philological methods and making important contributions to philology, sat in judgment on Indian philosophy-if they believed at all (as many of them do not, and, following them, many Western philosophers also do not believe) that Indian philosophy was truly philosophy. For us, the situation was exactly analogous to a scholar in Mittlehochdeutsch who, by virtue of expertise in that language, claimed to be an authentic Kant scholar and a true judge of Kantian philosophy.
In his Preface to Epistemology, Logic and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis, Matilal points out both these misleading paths. He regards it as unfortunate that Indian philosophy "has remained identified with mysticism and mistakenly thought to be inseparable from religion."2 And he insists that for the purpose of philosophical studies, philological research "should be treated not as an end but as a means to an end." Matilal, without doubt, did more than any one else to foster, promote, and validate the conception of Indian philosophy as a rigorous, theoretical, logical, and analytical enterprise. He was not alone in doing this.3 But he was the foremost advocate and did analytic philosophy very well-with his unique combination of training in the Sanskrit Nyaya tradition and in the Harvard Philosophy Department. He also had an advantage in that, at Oxford, he was able to befriend some of the best analytic philosophers-among them Strawson and Dummett; but he also got to know at first hand such sharp thinkers as J. L. Mackie, Gareth Evans (both of whom succumbed as he did to cancer), and Derek Parfit (whose work on personal identity bears the mark of what he learned from Matilal about Buddhism). They all found in him an authentic and admirable exponent of Indian philosophy, one who did not preach, but was eager both to learn from them and yet to philosophize with them about their problems, but using the tools of Indian philosophy.
Methodological Considerations
In the Preface to his first book, The Navya-Nyaya Doctrine of Negation, 4 
Vorstellung. Following him, an entire line of great thinkers-Husserl and
Heidegger among them-held that the idea of theory, and so of philosophy, was absent in Indian thinking, which therefore cannot be said to be philosophical. The view that Indian thinking was practical has been no less a component of modern Indian self-understanding. We all learned this in our graduate schools.
I will not on this occasion pause to demonstrate why I consider these opinions to be no more than cliches that will not survive the test of textual evidence. well as in the West-rises above the cultural milieu from which it has come and from which it derives its nourishment, achieving a certain level of conceptual idealization, and it is then that its discourse tends to be universal discourse. A philosophical thesis is then sought to be grounded in arguments, reasonings, and empirical evidence. It can then be called analytical in a broad sense. To say that a large part of Indian philosophy is analytical is not to assign that part to any standard school of analytic philosophy (which itself, as we know, is enormously variegated and differentiated). Perhaps one could say that philosophy was regarded in the Indian tradition as a hard-headed, rigorous discipline where definitions, arguments, and disputations prevailed, and which made use of grammar, philology, etymology, analysis of ordinary language (lokavyavahara), and an appeal to ordinary (and extra-ordinary) experience and textual hermeneutics for vindicating or refuting philosophical claims. In other words, philosophy was a most serious theoretical enterprise. Even the mystic who held that reality was ineffable sought to ground his thesis in logical reasoning-as Matilal argued in his Oxford Inaugural Lecture. 12 The second question was forcefully pressed, in a recent discussion in Calcutta, by Sibajiban (Bhattacharyya). Sibajiban's point was that since "fashions" in philosophy change, interpretative stances geared to the present style will inevitably make room for the latest to arrive on the scene. Stcherbatsky, for example, interpreted Buddhism using the jargon and conceptual framework of the prevailing German Neo-Kantianism, which is now obsolete for most purposes. 
